摘要
由于存在信息不对称的局面,使工程监理委托中作为受托方的业主和代理方的监理单位存在一定程度上的利益冲突,而且业主承担了信息不对称造成的损失风险。通过模型分析了工程监理委托过程中业主对监理方的管理绩效。
The situation of asymmetric information makes a certain benefit conflict between owner and supervisor in the case of project supervision, and the owner undertakes the loss risk caused by information asymmetry. This paper has analyzed the management performance of the owner to the supervisor during the project supervision entrusting by a model.
出处
《重庆建筑大学学报》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2006年第1期115-118,共4页
Journal of Chongqing Jianzhu University
关键词
不对称信息
业主
监理方
管理绩效
asymmetric information
owner
supervisor
management performance
