摘要
为考虑电子商务实施程度对零售商价格竞争行为的影响,论文采用一个两阶段博弈模型分两种情形对电子商务零售商与传统零售商的价格竞争行为进行了研究,给出了电子商务零售商和传统零售商的最优定价、均衡利润,以及电子商务消费者和传统消费者的分布情况.同时,论文得出了几个相关命题并结合实际情况进行了讨论.论文分析指出:在电子商务消费者临界价值评价不低于传统消费者临界价值评价的情形下,若其他条件保持不变,随着电子商务实施程度的不断提高,电子商务零售商和传统零售商的最优定价会不断降低;在电子商务消费者临界价值评价小于传统消费者临界价值评价的情形下,当电子商务实施程度超过一临界值时,电子商务零售商获取的利润将高于传统零售商获取的利润.
Considering the impacts of implementation degree of electronic commerce on retailers' behaviors, this paper applies a two-stage game model to study the price competition between an e-commerce retailer and a conventional retailer. Expressions for optimal prices, profits and consumers' distribution in equilibrium are derived. Some propositions are proved and discussed. This paper points out that, when the critical valuation of e-commerce consumer is more than or equal to that of conventional consumer, the product price of both retailers will decrease with implementation degree of electronic commerce; when the critical valuation of e-commerce consumer is less than that of conventional consumer, the profits of e-commerce retailer will be more than that of conventional retailer if implementation degree of electronic commerce is more than a critical value.
出处
《系统工程理论与实践》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2006年第1期35-41,共7页
Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice
基金
国家自然科学基金(70450001)
关键词
电子商务
零售商
价格竞争
消费者价值评价
electronic commerce
retailer
price competition
consumers' valuation of goods