摘要
康德的“三大批判”中,只有一、二“批判”具有哲学传统的“经典性”和理性功能的“自明性”,“第三批判”虽然亦是天才哲人的伟大创造,但缺乏一、二“批判”那种显明而庄严的特色。究其原因,是这种审美判断力,多少都沾滞着康德关于美学观念的主观独断性,这正如牟宗三所说,以判断力来沟通一、二“批判”是沟不通的。故而,以判断力作为一种经典性的美学原理,难以成立,即使勉强充当“桥梁”,也难免露出裂痕。尽管如此,判断力原理对后人的美学思考确实无尽的,尤其是关于美的两种分际与定义。
Of the three critiques of Kant's, the first and the second critiques have traditional properties of philosophy, but the third critique is different from the former two. The reason for this is that aesthetic judgment has more or less subjective dogmatism connected with Kant's aesthetic ideas. As Mu Zongsan puts it, judgment cannot communicate with the first and the second critiques. As an aesthetic principle, judgment cannot come into existence or even work as a "bridge" between them. in spite of this, judgment has given later generations countless reflections on aesthetics, especially two separations and definition of aesthetics.
出处
《学术月刊》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第2期65-70,共6页
Academic Monthly
关键词
美学
康德
判断力
真善美
Kant, judgment, the true, the good and the beautiful