摘要
本文从分析货币政策的规则和相机抉择之争入手,分析通货膨胀目标制作为名义锚在货币政策中的作用与政策含义,在此基础上探讨如何有效地设计和实行通货膨胀目标制。本文认为,我国货币政策在向通货膨胀目标制过渡过程中,要明确货币政策和汇率政策的主从地位,增强中央银行的独立性以及对宏观经济的分析和预测能力,解决中央银行承担最后贷款人义务而造成的通货膨胀隐患,建立核心通货膨胀指标。
Inflation Targeting as a monetary policy framework has been adopted by both developed and emerging countries in recent decade. This paper first reviews the policy credibility problem arising form time inconsistency problem, and the rule versus discretion distinction, as well as the role of nominal anchor. It then identifies inflation targeting as constrained discretion and the preconditions and technical details of established inflation-targeting framework. It concludes that China should avoid the conflict between monetary policy and exchange rate policy, enhance central bank independence and forecast capacity, deal with inflation bias as a result of LOLR as well as establish core inflation prior to adopting inflation targeting as a monetary policy strategy.
出处
《财贸经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第1期17-22,共6页
Finance & Trade Economics