国家助学贷款新政策下的动态博弈分析

Dynamic Game Analysis under the New Policy of National Student Loan

在推进国家助学贷款的过程中出现了发放和回收都不甚理想的情况,试图结合国家助学贷款新政策,从动态博弈的角度对银行与学生之间的博弈关系进行分析讨论,以期分析问题的关键,探讨新机制的运行效果。通过分析,得到这样的结论,国家助学贷款的新政策及其各项配套措施的落实可以实现该政策所期望达到的子博弈精练纳什均衡:({贷款,追讨},{还款,还款}),银行选择提供贷款,学生选择按约定还款。

Issuing and reclaiming of the national student loan are not very perfect. With the new policy of national student loan, the problem is analyzed by using dynamic game theory. The conclusion is that the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium can be achieved by carrying out the new policy and relevant measures. The bank will choose to provide the loan and the student will choose to comply with the loan contract.