民办高校中的委托代理问题和机制设计分析

Agency Problems and Mechanism Design in Private University

民办高校是具有等级结构的组织,校方和教师的关系是委托代理关系,由于校方和教师之间存在信息不对称,由此会带来代理问题即“逆向选择”和“道德风险”问题。解决问题的方法是设计有效的机制,对可能出现的“逆向选择”可以运用信号传递和信息甄别机制,对“道德风险”可以运用效率工资和工龄工资机制并配合强有力的监督机制。

Private University is a hierarchical organization. The relationship between university authorities and teachers is an agency relationship. Since there is asymmetric information between them, agency problems ,such as moral hazard and adverse selection will appear. The solution is to design an efficient mechanism.