论医生的双重角色及其激励相容

A Study on Doctor's Dual Role and It's Incentive Compatibility

在医患关系中,医生充当着双重角色,不仅作为患者的代理人或顾问为患者利益着想,同时也作为医疗服务的提供者为自己的利益着想。在这种双重角色下极易发生供者诱导需求,并进而导致过度医疗与医疗费用的上升。因此,有必要在支付机制、成本费用约束和外在监督等方面实现对医生的激励相容,以规范医疗行为,切实降低医疗费用。

In the doctor patient relationship, doctor is playing the dual role, namely not only considers patient benefit as patient＇ s agent or consultant, but also strives for own benefit as the medical service. It is frequently to occur supplier - induced demand under this kind of dual role, and lead to over treatment and the medical expense rise. Therefore, it is necessary to realize incentive compatibility in aspect as payment mechanism, cost expense restraint, external surveillance and so on to standard medical behavior and reduce the medical expense.