摘要
在牙买加体系下IMF的成员国有权选择汇率安排,有权确定和管理其货币汇率,但须遵守《IMF协定》所规定的义务,不得通过操纵汇率取得对其它成员国的不公平竞争优势。为了防范各国选择汇率安排的自由可能给国际货币体系带来的危害,IMF强化了对其成员国的政策的监督职能,并辅之以相应的执行措施。《IMF协定》规定的汇率义务和IMF职权构成衡量IMF成员国汇率义务的基准,以此审视,我国的人民币汇率制度符合IMF的规定和要求,不存在汇率操纵。
Member states of IMF within the Jamaica system are entitled to choose exchange rate arrangements, and to determine and manage the exchange rate of their currencies. But they must comply with the obligation stipulations in the IMF Agreement and not manipulate the exchange rate to gain unfair competitive advantages. For fear that some states should take advantage of their options to do damage to the international monetary system, IMF has enhanced its supervisory function over its members' policies and concurrently taken some relevant enforcement measures. The stipulations concerning the exchange rate obligation in the IMF Agreement and IMF's functions are deemed the benchmark to determine whether an IMF member state has fulfilled its exchange rate obligation. Under this test, China's Renminbi exchange rate complies with IMF's provisions and requirements and no manipulation can be found.
出处
《现代法学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第1期122-130,共9页
Modern Law Science
基金
教育部重大课题攻关项目"中国和平发展的重大国际法律问题研究"(04JZD0015)
关键词
IMF
汇率义务
监督权
执行权
人民币汇率
IMF
exchange rate obligation
supervisory function
enforcement power
exchange rate of Renminbi