中国上市公司两职设置与公司治理绩效关系的实证分析

An Empirical Study of the Selection of Corporate Leadership'Structure of Chinese Listed Companies

合理的上市公司领导权结构对于提高上市公司的监督与决策效率至关重要。以代理理论以及资源依赖理论为理论依据,在对中国上市公司治理状况调查的基础上,对有可能决定公司领导权结构的因素进行了系统的实证分析。在充分考虑公司治理机制替代作用的基础上,建立两职设置指数模型。实证结果表明我国上市公司在选择领导权结构时充分考虑了环境稳定性以及董事会规模等因素；大股东性质不同的上市公司两职设置有较大差异；法人股股东的控制能力越高,两职分离的程度越高。我国上市公司股权结构的不合理,降低了财务杠杆的监督效应。研究结果的政策含义是上市公司董事长与总经理两职分设还是兼任不能一概而论,而应充分考虑上市公司自身的特点而定,同时应进一步调整上市公司不合理的股权结构,以充分发挥财务杠杆的监督作用。

A reasonable structure of corporate leadership is very important for the improvement of the efficiency of an organization＇s monitoring and decision-making. This study is an attempt to investigate, with in the framework of agency theory and resource-dependence theory, the factors that may help to determine the corporate leadership structure in a Chinese listed companies. The results indicate Chinese listed companies take into account the environmental changes and scale of directorates when they choose the structure of corporate leadership. Great difference of leadership structure exists among different big shareholders： the higher the capability of corporation control, the greater the extent of separation between board chairman and CEO. But there is no substitution for the function of corporate governance mechanism. The implications for policy-making is that we should take into account the condition of different corporations and do not force every company to adapt themselves to one mode of leadership structure. Further optimizing the structure of corporate share should be taken for the sake of improving the efficiency of monitoring of Chinese listed companies.