相对业绩、股票再发行与盈余管理的群体行为

Relative Performance,Seasoned Equity Offerings and Herd Behaviors of Earnings Management

一家企业的盈余管理行为将受到其他企业盈余信息披露决策的影响,从而导致了群体企业之间盈余管理行为的“羊群效应”。在动态博弈中,进行股权再融资的所有企业都实施最大可能的盈余管理构成子博弈纳什均衡,使虚增报告盈余的边际收益等于边际成本。

Because investors often compare the financial statements of similar competing firms when deciding how to allocate their funds, it is likely that a firm＇s financial well - being depends on how well it performs relative to its rivals. In order to seek a comparison advantage in Seasoned Equity Offerings, each firm has strong incentive to acquire relative performance through earnings management, and enhance potential investors＇assessment of its profitability and investment value. Each firm＇s earnings management will be influenced by the earnings disclosure decisions of other firms, which leads to herd effect of earnings management. In dynamic game, each firm does its maximum feasible amount of earnings management in the sub - game perfect Nash equilibrium in each period, and the marginal benefits of reporting higher earnings must equal to its marginal costs.