摘要
本文针对克鲁格曼的“新贸易理论”中三个模型:技术创新与技术转让、发达国家的技术进步、发展中国家的技术进步,结合交易成本进行了分析探讨,应用不完全信息动态博弈模型分析发达国家与发展中国家在技术进步上的合作博弈,得出与克鲁格曼相反的结论:发展中国家的技术进步不会损害发达国家的利益,而且以技术创新为动力的要素报酬递增所引起的规模收益递增现象,引导发展中国家从事异质产品生产,给发达国家与发展中国家同时带来福利递增。为此,发展中国家应走反梯度分工演进道路。
Applying the transaction cost theory,this paper analyses the three models put torward by Krugman in Rethinking International Trade,and combining with the imperfect information game model. It also analyses the game between the developed and the developing on technology improvements,gets the conflict conclusion:the developing countries which have obtained technology innovations do not spoil the developed,on the contrary, increasing returns to scale from technology innovations inspires the developing to engage in manufacturing differential products so as to get increasing welfare for both parties, Consequently,the developing should carry out the; policy of anti-gradient evolution in intemational division of labor.
出处
《中国工业经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第2期13-20,共8页
China Industrial Economics
关键词
要素报酬递增
规模收益递增
技术创新
反梯度
increasing returns to factors
increasing returns to scale
technology innovation
anti gradient