跨国公司多层委托代理下的公司治理

Corporate Governance under Multi-class Principal-agency Relationships of Transnational Corporation

只要存在两权分离,就有可能存在委托代理关系。跨国公司产权关系在国际范围的进一步延伸和分离,使单体企业层面上的委托代理关系不断突破边界至企业集团层面,最后发展为跨国界的委托代理关系。由于组织形式的不断变化,跨国公司代理层级越来越多,关系越来越复杂,呈现出高成本和高风险的特点。跨国委托代理关系中的委托人与代理人博弈分析表明,代理链的长度并不能决定公司治理的绩效,关键在于代理链自身是否能产生有效的传导机制。为此,需要化解跨国委托中的代理风险,降低其代理成本,对公司而言,对代理人激励要到位,相应地对其监督和惩罚也要同时到位;对外部而言,则需要营造一种共同治理的环境。

As long as the two sorts of rights are separated, the principal-agency relationships exist. The further extension and separation of property rights relationships of transnational corporations in the international scope makes the principal-agency relationships of the single enterprises continuously break through the border of the enterprise group, and finally develop into the transnational ones. Due to the changeable institutional forms, agent classes increase quickly and correspondingly the relationships also become more and more complicated. High cost and risk appears. The analysis shows that the performance is decided by the effective transmitting mechanism, rather than hy the length of the agent chain. Therefore, in order to get rid of the risk and degrade the cost, the transnational corporations must own enough incentive mechanism as well as strict supervision and punishment, and the outside world needs to huild co-governance environment.