基于道德风险与有限责任约束的企业资本预算研究

Research on corporate capital budgeting based on the moral hazard and the limited liability constraints

在现实资本预算中,由于存在信息不对称,企业总部管理者并不简单地应用NPV规则.根据激励理论,在分权化企业的资本预算中,若分部管理者存在道德风险与有限责任,总部管理者必须对包含事前有限责任租金的激励成本与激励努力带来的预期收益进行权衡.当努力导致的收益介于最优激励成本与有限责任约束下的次优激励成本之间时,有限责任租金的存在将会导致总部管理者降低激励努力的水平,从而减少了投资期望收益,降低了资本的配置效率.

In realistic capital budgeting, headquarters mation asymmetry. The theory of incentives shows that should not naively apply the NPV rule because of infor headquarters has to trade off the incentive cost including the ex ante limited liability rents and the expected revenue produced by induced effort due to the moral hazard and limited liability of division managers in capital budgeting within decentralized firms. When the revenue is between the optimal incentive cost and second optimal incentive cost induced by the limited liability constraints, the existence of limited liability rents will decrease the level of effort, and reduce the expected revenue, hence, weakening the capital allocative efficiency.