摘要
本文基于中国证券市场的实际情况,修正了Michael和Kathleen(1992)等提出的非竞争模型,探讨内幕交易对证券价格有效性的影响,研究信息和被内幕交易排挤的市场专家数目之间的关系。研究结果表明内幕交易降低了证券价格的有效性,监管的关键在于促使信息在市场参与者之间的均匀分布。
The model mainly based on the noncompetition model proposed by Michael and Kathleen （1992） et cl. and is modified to accord with the reality of China＇ s stock market. The influence on efficiency of stock prices that insider trading has is discussed, then the relation between quality of information and the number of market professionals crowed out of the market is studied here. The conclusion is that insider-trading decreases the efficiency of stock price and the key of regulation is to urge the symmetry distribution of information between the participants of the market.
出处
《南方经济》
北大核心
2006年第2期29-37,共9页
South China Journal of Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70573034)。
关键词
内幕交易
有效性
信息质量
监管
Insider trading
Price efficiency
Quality of information
Regulation rides
