注册会计师独立审计的博弈分析

Game Theoretical Analysis of Independent Audit of CPA

当前我国注册会计师的独立审计服务质量不高已是一个不争的事实,文章认为作为一个理性的经济人注册会计师之所以未能提供高质量的审计服务与其所面临的审计执业环境有关。注册会计师独立审计在多方参与人之间进行着博弈,在不同的执业环境下形成不同的博弈支付矩阵,注册会计师会选择自己的最优策略,最终影响到审计质量。为此,要改变注册会计师的策略行为使其选择如实出具审计意见的诚信行为,需要改变注册会计师在与独立审计多方参与人之间进行的博弈矩阵支付。文章分析了三个最重要的方面:不同注册会计师之间的博弈;注册会计师与企业管理当局之间的博弈。注册会计师与监管当局之间的博弈。并根据分析的结果提出相应的建议。

It is an indisputable fact that the service of independent audit of CPA is generally in low quantity. This paper thinks that as a rational economist, CPAs＇ failure to offer high quantity audit serviceis attributed to their profession environments. CPAs are in games with many counterparts, which results in different game matrix payoffs in different circumstances. CPAs will choose their own optimal strategy that will determinate the quantity of independent audit finally. So if we want CPAs to offer faithful audit conclusion, we need remodel the payoffs in game matrix resulted from the interactions of CPAs and their counterparts to change their strategy. This paper analyses the most important three games： the games between different CPAs, CPAs and managements of enterprises, CPAs and regulating-authorities, then based on that it gives corresponding suggestions.