论保险监管中的博弈关系

Game Relationship in Insurance Regulation

自20世纪70年代末以来，中国保险业经历了恢复、发展和逐步市场化的阶段，保险监管也经历了由不健全到逐步健全的过程。对于仍时有发生的保险市场不规范问题，除了依照传统观点“对症下药”，还可引入“博弈论”，通过建立保险市场中经营者与监管者之间的动态博弈模型，分析我国保险市场中违规获利的诱惑力与法律法规的强制力之间的均衡、自律公约组织成员之间的“非合作博弈”的均衡，加强和完善保险监管工作。

China＇s insurance industry has gone through stages of resumption of business, development and gradual marketization since the end of 1970s and insurance regulation has gone from being incomplete to gradually become complete in this period of time. To guard against irregular issues that take place from time to time in the insurance market, we can not only prescribe remedies to suit specific cases, but also introduce the ＂game concept＂ to it. We can establish a dynamic game model between insurers and regulators to analyze the balance between the temptation to take profit from irregular practices and the mandatory power of law and regulation and the ＂non-cooperative game＂ balance between members of self-disciplinary organizations to improve regulation of the insurance sector.