奥尔森集体行动理论的贡献与误区——一种新制度主义的解读

Contribution and Misconception of Olson's Collective Action Theory—— An Interpretation of New Institutionism

奥尔森的贡献在于发现了日常经济生活中大型的无组织的集团行动的困难性,他的“搭便车”假设也能够解释一次性利益博弈。但是,奥尔森集体行动理论存在重大误区:以分析无组织的大型集团的“集体行动的逻辑”来分析小型集团的行动;以一次性博弈结局而解释作为多次博弈均衡的国家兴衰;奥尔森对传统的集团理论、多元论和国家理论的否定违反了制度变迁的基本史实;作为霍布斯主义者的奥尔森完全无视制度和道德的约束;被奥尔森当作决定性的利益集团只不过是政治体系中的次体系。在学术流派上,奥尔森最终从理性选择主义走向制度经济学。

The author holds that Olson＇s contribution lies in his findings about the difficulties of unorganized large group collective actions. His hypothesis of ＂free-rider＂ can also explain the once-and-for-all game for interests. But there are serious limitations in Olson＇s theory. They are as follows, applying the logic of collective action of large groups to analyze that of small groups; using the result of one attempt to explain the complicated situation of the rise and fall of a country and the consequences of many rounds of interest plays; his denial of the traditional group theory, the traditional pluralist theory and the traditional theory of the state violated the fundamental historical facts of institutional evolution; being a Hobesist he completely ignored the institutional and moral restrictions; and the interest group which Olson regarded as a decisive factor is but of sub-politi- cal system. His academic position finally changed from rational choice to institutional ecoucmics.