创业资本的分阶段融资激励与控制权分配——基于信息不对称的视角被引量：8

Incentive Capital in Staged Finance and The allocation Control rights——Review of Asymmetric Information

下载PDF

导出

摘要文章在激励基础上,对创业投资中特有的分阶段融资和控制权转移现象进行了研究。对于分阶段融资,文献研究从企业家发生道德风险的角度出发,不可避免出现了一些问题和矛盾,而对于控制权分配和转移问题,Aghion和Bolton的经典CTM模型对信息对称的假设,不符合创业投资的实际情况。文章从信息角度出发,放松了CTM系列模型有关信息对称的假设条件,并在不完全合同理论框架下对分阶段融资和控制权展开研究,得到了一系列结论。 The hypothesis of in the classic CTM is analyzed in this paper. The conclusion found that there is a relation between the informarion and the invest incentive or the allocation of the control rights. For example, if the information is good enough that the invest incentive is big and the control rights are contingent transfer; but under justly conditions, the invest incentive is poor and VC get full control; if the information is bad, there is no investment. All this research is the relation of information; invest incentive and allocation of control rights in staged finance.

作者李金龙费方域谈毅

机构地区上海交通大学管理学院

出处《山西财经大学学报》 CSSCI 2006年第1期90-96,共7页 Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

关键词信息不对称分阶段融资控制权分配 asymmetric information staged finance allocation of control rights

分类号 F832.48 [经济管理—金融学]

引文网络
相关文献

参考文献14

1Aghion P,P Bolton.An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting[J].Review of Economic Studies,1992,(77):338 -401.
2Barry C,Muscarella C,Peavy J.The Role of Venture Capital in the Creation of Public Companies:Evidence from the Going Public Process[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1990,(27):447-471.
3Berglof E.A Control Theory of Venture Capital Finance[J].Journal of Law,Economics and Organization,1994,(10):247-267.
4Black B,Gilson R.Venture capital and Structure of Capital Markets:Banks versus Stock Markets[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1998,(47):243-277.
5Chan Y,Siegel D,Thakor A.leaning,Corporate Control and Performance Requirements in Venture CaPital Contracts[J].International Economic Review,1990,(31):393-414.
6Dewatripont M,J Tirole.A theory of Debt and Equity:Diversity of Securities and Manager Shareholder Congruence[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1994,(109):1027-1054.
7Gompers P.Grand standing in the Venture Capital Industry[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1996,(42):133-156.
8Gompers P A,Lerner J.The use of covenants:an empirical analysis of venture partnership agreements[J].Journal of Law and Economics,1996,(39):463-498.
9Hellman T.Financial structure and control in venture capita[R].Working paper,Stanford University,1993.
10Hellmann T.The Allocation of Control Rights in Venture Capital Contracts[J].Rand Journal of Economics,1998,29(1):57-76.

二级参考文献34

1郝宇,韩文秀.风险企业控制权配置研究[J].天津大学学报（社会科学版）,2005,7(2):102-105. 被引量：10
2欧阳凌,欧阳令南,周红霞.创业投资企业的控制权配置与非效率投资行为[J].系统工程理论方法应用,2005,14(2):104-107. 被引量：10
3Aghion P, P Bolton. An incomplete contracts approach to financial contracting[J]. Review of Economic Studies, 1992. 77 : 338-401.
4Berglof E. A control theory of venture capital finance[J]. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 1994. 10:247-267.
5Chan Y, Siegel D, Thakor A leaning. Corporate control and performance requirements in venture capital contracts[J]. International Economic Review, 1990,31: 393-414.
6Dewatripont M, J Tirole. A theory of debt and equity: Diversity of securities and manager shareholder congruence [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1994, 109:1027-1054.
7Grossman S,O Hart. The costs and benefits of ownership: A theory of vertical and lateral integration[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1986,94. 691-719.
8Hart O,J Moore. Property rights and the nature of the firm[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1990,98.1119-1158.
9Hellmann T. The allocation of control rights in venture capital contracts[J]. Rand Journal of Economics, 1998, 29(1) : 57-76.
10Kaplan Steven N, Per Stromberg, How do venture capitalists choose investments? [R]. Working Paper, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago, 2000.