摘要
文章运用现代经济学的外部性理论探讨森林采伐业在完全竞争的市场下供需失衡的理论根源,探讨了采伐的控制量,进而分别讨论了政府解决“市场失灵”问题的三种激励措施,最后还探讨了为避免“政府失灵”而实施的产权配置的市场方式。
In this article, the theoretical basis, which causes the loss of balance in supply and demand of forest resources, under complete market situation, is studied using the external economical theory of modem economics. Then it discuses control quantity of forest felling and three kinds of governmental incentive methods solved through the market failure respectively. At last, it also discusses property right allocation carried out in the market method to avoid ＂government failure＂.
出处
《林业经济问题》
北大核心
2006年第1期5-8,共4页
Issues of Forestry Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70473014)
关键词
森林采伐
外部性
市场失灵
市场机制
产权
forestry felling
external effects of forestry
market failure
market mechanism
property right
