摘要
分析两个互联网骨干网斯坦克尔伯格(Stackelberg)竞争和互联互通质量序贯均衡。对于前者,重点分析了企业利润、社会福利与互联互通质量的关系,得出骨干网间互联互通应该是有层次的、有所区别的,同时确保一定的互联互通质量是必要的;通过对后者的分析得出,在已有业务或用户间,骨干网网间若是高质量的互联互通,其在新业务或用户间必然也采取高质量的互联互通,同时也得出在互联网规模较小时,骨干网间将会选择较高的互联互通质量。
The Stackelberg competition game and interconnection quality sequential equilibrium between two IBPs (IBPs: internet backbone providers) is studied to promote internet development and lay out reasonable interconnection policy. For the former, it emphasizes on the relationship between the corporation profit, social welfare and interconnection quality. It concludes that Interconnection between IBPs must be hierarchical and differential and interconnection quality to a certain extent is essential. For the latter, if Interconnection quality between the mature services or the old consumers is high, the IBPs must implement high interconnection quality between the new services or consumers. It also concludes that when the scale of internet is low. interconnection aualitv between IBPs must be high.
出处
《北京理工大学学报(社会科学版)》
2006年第1期58-62,共5页
Journal of Beijing Institute of Technology:Social Sciences Edition
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70472073)
关键词
互联互通
先发优势
直联
管制外部性
interconnection
first-mover advantage
peering
regulatory externality