中国财政分权与地方公共品的供给

Fiscal Decentralization and Local Public Good Provision in China

财政激励与预算外收入是密切相关的。我们考察了财政分权背景下财政激励对地方公共品的供给满足当地真实需要的敏感度(responsiveness)的影响。中国的财政分权依然存在一些问题：首先,规模巨大的预算外收入会扩大地方政府的规模,从而加重当地居民和农民的负担；其次,地方政府预算外支出的规模效应递减；第三,城市化水平 (以非农人口占总人口的比例来衡量)和地方政府对城市维护方面的支出负相关,表明中国的工业化进程和城市化进程并不一致。

Fiscal incentive is closely related with the extra-budgetary revenues.Based on our definition of“fiscal incen- tive”,we explore the impacts of fiscal incentives under decentralization on responsiveness of public good provi- sion to real local needs.There are also some problems in fiscal decentralization in China:firstly,with a huge basis of extra-budgetary revenue,the size of local government would be expanded,resulting in a heavier bur- den on the shoulder of local citizens and peasants;secondly,there exist some decreasing return to scale in lo- cal extra-budgetary expenditure;thirdly,“urbanization”(measured as the ratio of rural population to the total population) is negatively correlated with the local extra-budgetary expenditure on urban maintenance,indicat- ing that in China,the process of industrialization and urban construction are not consistent.