中间商在伪劣商品流通中的行为分析

The Behavior Analysis of Dealers in the Circulation of Fake and Inferior Commodities

由于以“打假”为主的末端治理效果有限,本文提出从流通环节加以防范,以抑制伪劣商品在市场上流通,进而打消生产商制假的念头．通过博弈模型的构建,分析了中间商在伪劣商品流通中的行为选择及其对应效用之间的关系,中间商的声誉越高、贴现率越大以及监管部门对其的查获概率越大都会促使中间商远离购销伪劣商品．

Based on the fact that the present way of ＂cracking down fake and inferior commodities＂ is limited, another way of preventing from the circulation controling fake and inferior commodities in the market circulation and then making manufacturers give up the idea of manufacturing it is brought forward. The relationship between dealers＇ behavior choices in the circulation of fake and inferior commodities and their utilities by building a game model is also analyzed and then the conclusion is given as follows： the better the reputation, the more the discount rate and the checking-rate, the less dealers will purchase and sell fake and inferior commodities.