法律经济学的分析与搭售合理性的认知

Analysis of Law Economics and Cognition of Tying Rationality

法律经济分析对于法律内在运行逻辑的认识非常重要。在芝加哥学派理论之前,搭售通常被认为是延伸垄断力量,获取双倍垄断利润的方式,美国在搭售上的相关判决也都表明了对这种主要依据经验规则进行判断的认识方式的支持。而芝加哥学派通过法律经济分析方法所构建的单一利益模型表明,在现实生活中广泛存在的搭售具有相当的合理性,搭售并不是垄断力量有效率的运用方式,而仅仅是价格歧视的实现工具。随着芝加哥学派理论的发展,搭售在质量保证、产品风险分担等等方面的合理性都被进一步发掘出来。尽管芝加哥学派的理论也受到了其他经济学家的批判,并被证明是不完善的,但其通过经济学模型的构建来解释搭售的存在合理性则无疑增强了对现实问题的解释力。

Chicago Scbool sets up a single monopoly model, pointing out the monopolizers are unable to make profits in two markets through tying. Tying, as an improper approach to monopoly power, can just make profits by pricing discrimination. As a result, tying can enhance efficiency and is therefore legal. However, other economists constitute lots of more specific models to point out the deficiencies of Chicago School. Although there are many drawbacks, Chicago School＇s attributions are the rationality of tying arrangement they illuminate.