多任务委托——代理关系中激励机制优化设计

Optimal Designment for the Incentive Mechanism among Multi-Task Principal-Agent

本文对任务之间存在可替代性的多任务委托———代理激励机制优化设计问题进行了研究,并在优化模型的基础上,对相对激励强度进行了比较静态分析。研究表明,委托人对于重要性高的任务的激励力度应高于重要性低的任务的激励力度;同时,委托人对于不确定性较低任务的激励力度也应大于不确定性较高任务的激励力度;而随着两任务可替代性的增强,这种较高的激励力度应该得到进一步加强。

In this paper, the problem about optimal designment for the incentive mechanism among replaceable multi-task principle-agent is researched. Based on the optimal model, the comparative static analysis for the relative incentive intensity is done. The researchment show that the more important task suits the stronger incentive contract Similarity, the stronger incentive contract suits the more uncertain task. The more replacement between two task, the stronger incentive contract should give to the task which is more important or uncentain.