摘要
依照微观经济学和产业组织理论,高度集中产业市场中的寡头厂商往往会在价格变量上形成暗中或默契的价格串谋,使产业市场处在一种“准完全垄断”的状态。广告是企业主要的非价格竞争变量之一,重复博弈的结果使得寡头厂商能够走出囚徒困境(放弃产品的广告宣传),而垄断利润的存在导致第三方潜在进入的威胁,在位寡头厂商必然会联合起来进行抵制,通过广告串谋提高市场进入壁垒。
The firms usually conspire on price in the oligopoly markets according to the theory of microeconomics and industry organization, thus forming a par monopoly market. Advertising is one of the main non-price competition variables. The repeated games enable the oligarch firms to go out of the " Prisoners Dilemma"; while the monopoly profit may cause the entry of the third party, and in this circumstance, the firms will be united to resist the entry-enhancing the market entry barrier by advertising.
出处
《经济与管理》
2006年第3期85-87,共3页
Economy and Management
关键词
寡头垄断
广告
串谋
进入壁垒
oligopoly
advertisement
collusion
barrier to entry