信息共享程度对物流外包激励契约的影响

Affections of Information Sharing for Incentive Contracts in Logistics Outsourcing

本文分析了由供应商、制造商和第三方物流企业(3PLs)组成的物流外包系统,考虑了供应商和制造商信息共享程度的影响,建立了协同工作环境下的激励契约模型。结果表明,委托人偏好低努力水平时,信息共享对激励契约没有影响;委托人偏好高努力水平时,信息共享能更好的激励代理人选择委托人希望的行动。信息不共享时,3PLs只有提高对供应商努力水平的积极性;信息共享时,3PLs收入波动性增大,提高对供应商和对制造商的努力水平都能使其获得帕累托改进。本研究为物流成本在供应链成员中的分摊提供了理论依据,并提出了模型改进和研究建议。

This paper analyzes, a logistics outsourcing system which coasists of a supplier, a manufacturer and a third- party logistics supplier （3PLs）. Based on coordination work, an incentive contract model is presented, while the affections of information sharing are considered. When the principal prefers the higher efforts, information sharing could create more chance for the principal to acquire more private information to monitor actions of the 3PLs. It encourages the 3PLs to work in principal＇s interest. The paper ends with a discussion of improvement of the model and directions for future research.