分配制度与转型企业

Distribution Rules and Transition-type Firms

本文通过一个合作博弈框架下的企业模型,在国有企业转型的背景中,初步讨论了企业内部分配制度对企业行为的影响。文章认为经济转型阶段的部分国有企业的一个特征是企业内部的分配制度与市场型企业相比受到了更多的限制。这一特征会导致追求利润最大化的转型企业的行为产生一定的扭曲。在转型企业和市场型企业共存的混合经济中,一个转型企业向市场型企业转变将使得所有企业获利,但将损害劳动者的整体福利。如果对劳动力的流动存在着一定的限制,转型企业的行为扭曲会被强化。

Using a firm model within a cooperative game framework, this paper discusses the role of distribution rule in analyzing the firm＂ s behavior under the background of the transition of SOEs. We assume that, during the transition stage, an important character of some SOEs is that more restrictions are imposed on their distribution rule relative to market-type firms. This causes distortion in the profit-maximizing transition firm＇s behavior. Furthermore, in a hybrid economy in which transition-type and market-type firms co-exist, the transformation of a transition-type firm into a market-type firm has a positive externality on other firms, but will harm the labors. Finally, ff the flow of labor forces is restricted, the behavioral distortion of transition-type firms will be intensified.