摘要
本文研究对象是公民团体在履行社会责任中的群体败德现象。首先分析了“绝对自私”、“完全责任”和“部分责任”三种群体的博弈情况,随后在经典的“N人博弈”结论的基础上进一步探析,尝试引出了“博弈网”的新概念,并给出了在“博弈网”结构下的均衡情况和简要证明。文章最后阐述了在这种博弈结构下导致“群体败德”的原因,并提出了应对该种博弈结果的相关对策。
This topic discusses collective demoralization, or the evasion of social responsibility by a group of citizens. This paper introduces the new concept of "game-net", rather than the standard "N-players game" in the classical approach, and illustrates how this kind of game leads to the "collective demoralization" equilibrium. In conclusion, some policy and institutional countermeasures to collective demoralization are suggested.
出处
《北京大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第2期125-131,共7页
Journal of Peking University(Philosophy and Social Sciences)
关键词
博弈理论
“博弈网”
社会责任
群体败德
game theory
"game-net"
social responsibility
collective demoralization
equilibrium