存差、金融控制与铸币税——兼对我国“M2/GDP过高之谜”的再解释

Deposit-and-Loan Difference, Financial Government Control, and Seigniorage

本文试图全面和深入解析金融机构存差这一重要金融现象。研究发现,目前关于存差的很多认识是似是而非的,我国金融机构存差的产生很大程度上是政府在经济转轨过程中实施金融控制的结果。而铸币税则是政府实施金融控制能够获得的主要收入,正是政府为征收铸币税所导致的基础货币增长成为导致金融机构存差的主要原因。据此本文建立了一个一般性的分析框架,将存差、金融控制和铸币税之间建立起紧密的逻辑联系,分析相互关系与相互影响。研究还发现,存差扩大与我国M2/GDP的快速上升都同金融控制政策有密切关系。这一新的分析框架有助于从更高层面更全面的理解存差现象,及其背后所隐藏的深刻的转轨经济学含义。

In this paper, we try to analyze comprehensively and intensely the important phenomenon that there is deposit-loan difference (DLD) in financial institutions. In our study, we have found that, at present, the apprehension of DLD is specious and that, in China's financial institutions, the existence of DLD has been, to a great extent, the upshot of governmental financial control in economic transition. And seigniorage has been the main revenue the government can obtain in financial control. It is this fact that the increase of base money resulting from governmental taxation has been the main cause for DLD in financial institutions. On this basis, in this paper, we have constructed a general analytical framework, forming a strong logic link between DLD, financial control and seigniorage, and analyzing their interrelation and interaction. In our study, we have also found that both the increase of DLD and the rapid swelling of China's M2 and GDP are closely associated with the policy of financial control. This new framework will help to appreciate more comprehensively and more profoundly DLD and the deep meaning-concealed therein- of transition economics.