摘要
文章从不对称信息角度出发,运用信息经济学和博弈论相关理论,通过建立企业集团财务控制—激励机制模型,研究集团母公司如何设计有效的报酬合同以及如何在该合同中能同时体现母公司对子公司经营者的财务控制和激励机制的问题,以克服子公司经营者“道德风险”,最终实现企业集团财务价值最大化。
Based on asymmetric information and applying the theory of information economies, by the construction of model of financial controls and incentive mechanism, this paper tries to study the problem of how to design the effective salary contract to get the integration of financial controls and incentive mechanism, for conquering the moral hazard of the manager of the son company. Finally, business group can gain the maximization of financial value.
出处
《华东经济管理》
2006年第3期101-103,共3页
East China Economic Management
关键词
不对称信息
企业集团
财务控制
激励机制
asymmetric information
business group
financial controls
incentive mechanism
