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人力资本、独立董事激励与公司治理

Incentive of human capital and independent director for corporate management
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摘要 从独立董事的人力资本角度出发来研究公司治理中独立董事的激励问题。独立董事制度的出现,源于早期公司治理安排的失败,特别是董事会职能的失效。但是,实证研究并没有发现独立董事有助于改善公司业绩的有力证据。对于独立董事的人力资本性质缺乏认识,就不可能发挥独立董事在公司治理中的有效作用。本文分析了独立董事激励机制的现状,从委托代理理论以及契约理论出发,认为只有从独立董事的人力资本性质出发来对其进行激励,才能够发挥独立董事在公司治理中的作用。同时,也探讨了中国独立董事激励机制的弊端。 From the human capital's perspective, this paper casts light on the issue as to the independent directors' incentives. The emergence of independent directors was derived from the failure of early corporate governance, notably the ineffectiveness of the board. Nevertheless, positive research couldn' t provide strong evidence to prove that independent directors would phy an effective role in corporate governance, Devoid of the concept regarding independent directors as human capital, we could not expect independent direetom to be effectivein corporate govemanco. This paper provides analysis to the status quo of the independent directors' incentive mechanism. Based on principal- agent theory and contract theory, this paper holds that independent directors,expected to act properly, should be galvanized according to their characteristics of human capital. Meanwhile, thedefects of the incentive mechanism as to independent directors in China are explored.
作者 洪亮
机构地区 厦门大学会计系
出处 《福建建材》 2006年第1期57-60,共4页 Fujian Building Materials
关键词 独立董事 人力资本 公司治理 剩余控制权 剩余索取权 indcpendent director, human capital, corporate governance, rights of residual control, rights of residual claim
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