代理合约特性与我国转轨经济中的地方政府间恶性竞争

haracteristics of Principal-agent Contract and Evil Competition among Chinese Local Governments during Economic Transition

从合约理论来看,转轨时期处于单一制国家结构形式中的我国地方政府职能履行所依据的是一种行政性经济代理合约。合约特性及其治理机制的缺陷决定了地方官员理性的竞争行为选择与公众利益的要求并不能保持一致,从而形成地方政府间恶性竞争的局面。遏制恶性竞争的治本之策是针对体制弊端而展开的一系列制度创新行为。

According to contract theory, the local governments in China during the economic transition are performing their functions on the basis of administrative and economic principal-agent contract. The characteristics of contract and the defects of corresponding mechanism have resulted in the inconsistency of public benefits and local officials＇ rational competitive behaviors, which will bring about the evil competitions among local governments. The fundamental and effective way to curb evil competitions is to carry out a series of institutional innovations against the corresponding defects.