期刊文献+

补偿机制在推行经济体制改革中作用 被引量:1

The Role of Compensation Mechanism in Economic Restructuring
下载PDF
导出
摘要 政府无法满足改革中失利群体的补偿要求是改革受阻的主要原因。失利群体通常具有有关政府行为和政府补偿扭曲的私人信息,而政府通常无法掌握失利者群体的私人信息。因而,政府通常很难找到最优办法来补偿经济体制改革中的失利者。当经济体制改革是连贯的,且政府是根据失利者群体的意愿进行补偿时,第一轮改革时的政府补偿有利于阻止第二轮改革时的失利者群体组织起来阻止改革,因而有利于推进改革。尽管政府把握失利者群体的私人信息,但政府对改革失利方的补偿机制不可行,则再好的改革也无法进行下去。 The main obstruction of the restructuring is that the government fails to meet the demands for compensation of disadvantaged groups in the restructuring. The government fails to obtain their personal information; consequently, the government has difficulty finding the best way to compensate the disadvantaged in economic restructuring. The governmental compensation in the first round of restructuring helps prevent the disadvantaged groups in the second round from stopping it, promoting the whole restructuring. Without a feasible compensation mechanism, the government could not carry on the restructuring even with the personal information of disadvantaged groups.
作者 安虎森 邹璇
出处 《江苏社会科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2006年第2期89-93,共5页 Jiangsu Social Sciences
关键词 经济体制改革 失利群体 补偿机制 economic restructuring disadvantaged groups compensation mechanism
  • 相关文献

参考文献13

  • 1Fernandez, R. and Rodrik, D.“Resistance to Reform:Status Qua Bias in the Presence of Individual- Specific Uncertainty”, American Economic Review. 1991. 81. 1146.
  • 2Krusel, and Rios -Rall,“Politico- economic equilibrium and economic growth”, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,January 1997. 21. 245.
  • 3Parente, S. L and E.C. Prescott,“Barriers to Technology Adoption and Development”, The Journal of Political Economy.1994. 102. 303.
  • 4Parente, S.L. and E. C. Prescott,“Monopoly Rights: A Barrier to Riches”, The American Economic Review, 1999. 89. 1216.
  • 5Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts,“Limit Pricing and Entry Under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis”, Econometrica, 1982. 50. 443.
  • 6Kreps, D. and R. Wilson,“Sequential Equilibrium”, Econornetrica. 1982.50. 863.
  • 7Fudenberg D. and Kreps D.“Reputation and Muhiple Op-ponents.Ⅰ: htentical Entrants”. Rev. Econ. Stud. 1987. 54.541.
  • 8Dewatripont Mathias, and Gerard Roland,“Economic Reform and Dynamic Political Constraints”, Review of Economic Studies, 1992. 59. 703.
  • 9Besley, T. and S. Coate,“Sources of Inefficiency in a Representative Democracy: A Dynamic Analysis”, American Economic Review. 1998. 88. 139.
  • 10Fernandez, R. and Rodrik, D.,“Resistance to Reform:Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual- Specific Uncertainty”, American Economic Review, 1991. 81. 1146.

同被引文献11

引证文献1

二级引证文献3

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部