序列成本定价机制的公理化分析

Axiomatic Analysis of Serial Cost Pricing

研究了序列成本定价机制对同质分配模型公理体系的满足情况,并着重探讨了该机制与上限性、下限性、免费午餐、需求可控性和一致性公理的关系.在同质模型的前提下,序列成本定价满足除去成本函数单调性、一致性和需求可控性之外的所有公理特性要求.比较了序列成本定价机制和平均成本定价机制满足上限性、下限性、免费午餐、需求可控性等公理的情况.结果表明,当代理人的需求不易控制时,平均成本定价具有明显优势;反之序列成本定价较好.

Axiomatic system of the homogeneous cost sharing was proposed, and serial cost pricing was analyzed axiomatically. The axiomatic characters of this cost sharing method are proven. The relation between the serial cost pricing and the axioms of upper bound, lower bound, free lunch, controllability of demand and consistency was discussed in detail. It is indicated that serial cost pricing meets all the axioms in the homogeneous axiomatic system except monotony of cost function, control of demand and consistency. Serial cost pricing was compared with average cost pricing in terms of meeting the atoms of upper bound, lower bound, free lunch and control of demand. The result shows that serial cost pricing is obviously better when the needs of agents are easily controlled. Otherwise, average cost pricing is better.