期刊文献+

基于CPFR的供应商与零售商关系治理研究 被引量:6

Research on vendor-retailer relationship governance based on CPFR
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摘要 CPFR(Collaborative P lann ing Forecasting&Rep len ishm ent合作计划、预测与补充)是近几年国内外供应链领域研究热点。在本文中,CPFR被界定为应用于供应链中跨企业的关系专用性信息技术(IT)系统,该系统不仅帮助企业通过信息共享获取战略收益与竞争收益,同时作为一种关系合同,为合作企业提供一种不依赖于所有权的控制与激励,连同声誉、信任与适应形成一种有效的治理模式。 CPFR( Collaborative Planning Forecasting & Replenishment)has become the new focus of supply chain research in recent years. In the paper, CPFR is defined as a relation specific IT system between firms. This system not only can help firms to get strategic income and competitive income through information sharing, but also can achieve control and inspiration along with report, trust and adaptation without resorting to ownership, thus provide an alternative hybrid governance mode.
作者 徐军玲 王韬
出处 《科研管理》 CSSCI 北大核心 2006年第2期109-113,共5页 Science Research Management
关键词 CPFR 信息共享 关系合同 治理 CPFR information sharing relational contract governance
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参考文献12

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二级参考文献10

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