开放经济中的国有企业民营化——基于产品异质的一个博弈模型

Privatization of SOE in an Open Economy——A Model Based on Product Heterogeneity

本文将对开放经济中国有企业民营化的研究置于价格竞争和产品异质假设之上。本国政府,外企母公司,本国国企,外企本国分公司之间的博弈表明政府不会对国企实行完全私有化,也不会保持百分之百的国有股份不变。我们考察了转移价格,民营化水平,技术创新和产品差异度等因素对国内市场价格和需求的影响。国有企业要在对外竞争中生存,除进行产权改革外,还必须通过技术创新,加大研发和广告投入等方式缩小其产品与国外产品的差异。

This paper investigates the privatization of state-owned enterprises （SOE） in an open economy, using Hotelling Model to deal with the basic assumptions of price competition and product heterogeneity. We look into a game played by the government, SOE, the foreign company and its branch,and find there is no pure strategy for SOE or the foreign company in equilibrium. At least, however, the government will not have SOE completely privatized; neither will it make SOE remain state-owned. We find how prices and demands of domestic market are influenced by transfer price, degree of pfivatization, technology development and the distinction between domestic and imported goods. To survive the challenge of foreign competitors, SOE has to minimize product heterogeneity by technology development, more support to R＆A and advertising.