制度偏好差异与电力产业规制放松的困境——“厂网分开”引发的深层思考

The Heterogeneity of Preference on Regime and Deregulation Lagging of the Electricity Industry

本文利用“芝加哥”学派利益集团理论的基本假设,对我国电力产业内部人势力的形成、强化及其行为对市场交易的扭曲进行了详尽的分析,从而为当前电力产业规制困境的发生提出了一个基于制度偏好和企业行为的解释。结果表明,在缺乏有效规制的背景下,对自然垄断产业实施等同于一般产业的“放权让利”式改革,为利益集团的成长提供了制度条件和资金支持。由于管制权力分散在诸多的“条块”之间,“厂网分开”后也没有建立权威性的专业机构,不同利益取向的参与者之间的博弈使电力产业的规制放松陷入困境。

This paper captures the interest groups assumptions of the ＂Chicago Sehool＂,makes an exhaustive studies on the emerging,strengthen of the electricity industry insider power,and how it＇s distorting the market trade. Our analysis given an interpretation about the present electricity industry deregulation lagging to the regime preference and firm behavior. We found that,the government taken the ＂relax right and give away benefit＂ policy for the nature monopoly industry as same as others,had provided institution and finance support for the interest groups grow up without the regulation limited. With the divesture of vertically integration,the regulatory power dispersed over many departments or section,the regulatory lack authority and specialization. Under this situation the game or conflict between the participants make the deregulation into plight.