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乡镇企业上市公司经营者报酬与公司绩效、规模相关性实证研究 被引量:1

On the Correlation between Remuneration to Management,Corporate Performance and Corporate Scale in Public-Listed Township Companies
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摘要 企业经营绩效是衡量经营者生产率的一个重要方面,经营者任务的复杂性和完成任务的重要性与企业的规模密切相关。文章应用乡镇企业上市公司相关数据分析表明,乡镇企业上市公司经营者报酬与企业绩效、规模分别呈正相关和弱正相关关系,并对其形成的原因进行了探讨。 Corporate performance is an important indicator in assessing the management team of this company. The complexity and the significance of management's tasks closely correlate with the scale of the company. This article analyses the correlation data of some township enterprises that are listed on the stock market, and results reveal that remuneration to management has correlation with the enterprises' performance, and has weak correlation with the enterprises' scale. The article further analyzes the cause of such a correlation.
作者 王胜利
出处 《中国农业大学学报(社会科学版)》 2006年第1期63-66,共4页 Journal of China Agricultural University;Social Sciences
关键词 乡镇企业 报酬激励 相关性 Township enterprises Remuneration incentive Correlation
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