基于委托——代理模型的公司与经理、董事激励博弈分析

Incentive Game Analysis Between Company And Manager/Director Based on Principal-Agency Model

近几年来,用委托——代理模型来分析公司与经理、董事激励关系,已经逐渐成为激励理论研究的热点。在委托——代理关系的框架下,建立了企业经理与企业董事的选择激励模型,模型分析表明:公司治理结构是现代企业中一组规范股东、董事会和经理班子权利责任的制度安排,它的一个重要功能是通过制衡机制对代理人实施约束和激励。两种模型的形成或选择主要取决于相对应的组织资源与市场资源的状况和可利用度。

In recent years, it is popular to use Principal-Agency model in analyzing the incentive relation in the incentive theory .In this paper, we had established the Incentive Selecting mode of corporation manager and director. The result indicated that rule structure of corporation is a set of system which organized the right and duty among shareholder, director and manager. At the same time, the other important function of this incentive model is to put in practice which restricts and inspirits agency. In the end, the form and choice of this two models mostly lies on the status and utilize degree of relatively organizing resource and market resource.