一种成本和收益不同的双头垄断期权博弈模型

An Asymmetric Duopoly Option-game Model

以新市场模型为基础,在不对称双头期权博弈框架下研究企业的投资决策。当领先企业为了获得长期的先动优势,要比跟随企业付出更大的成本时,领先企业与跟随企业的成本比值与两个临界值的关系决定了投资决策和博弈均衡结果,在给定先动优势的情况下,随着占先成本的增大,企业抢先的积极性会越来越弱。

Based on the new market model, this paper considers the investment decision in the framework of asymmetric duopoly option-game, To gain the permanent first-mover-advantage, the leader＇s cost is larger than that of the follower. The Investment decision and the type of equilibrium depend on the relationship between the ratio of the cost of the leader and that of the follower and two critical values. Given the first-mover-advantage, with the cost of first-mover increasing, the incentive of becoming leader decreases.