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从抽象的主人到具体的主体——兼论国有企业的制度安排

From Owner in Name to Subject of Transaction
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摘要 国企改革的困境主要源于理论上对国企人假设失误;政策上混淆了产权、所有权和所有制的经济功能;制度安排上否定了人力资本所有者的所有权和剩余索取权。因此改变理论假设前提,完善政策体系,在制度安排上确立国有产权的各类交易主体及其所有权,是确保经济体制改革取得成功的关键。 We hold that the roots of the predicament of state-owned enterprise reform lie in erroneous hypothesis of state-enterprise-employee relationship, obscure economic functions of property rights, proprietary rights and ownership, and denying ownership and residual claims human resource owners are entitled to. The key to the success of economic reform is, therefore, to correct the false theoretical hypothesis, recognize the subjects of state-owned property transaction and their ownership, and perfect the policies concerning ownership.
作者 刘炳辉
出处 《厦门理工学院学报》 2006年第1期42-45,共4页 Journal of Xiamen University of Technology
关键词 理论假设 主人翁 利益主体 制度安排 theoretical hypothesis owner beneficial subject system arrangement
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