组合会计政策选择的契约动因研究

Research on the Contractual Motivations of Combined AccountingPolicy Choices

本文以2003年进行了自愿性会计政策变更的沪深上市公司数据为研究对象,采用截面修正Jones模型进行操控性应计利润的分离,得到反映企业组合会计政策选择对利润的影响金额,进而检验了组合会计政策选择的三大契约动因。研究发现:权益负债率高、存在报酬契约的公司更可能选择提高当期盈余的组合会计政策,从而证实了债务契约假设和报酬契约假设;由于我国企业所处的特殊政策环境,政治成本假设检验得到与假设相反的结果。

This paper investigates some list companies that changed their accounting policies voluntarily in 2003. We use the Cross-sectional Modified Jones Model to separate discretionary accruals and examine the three contractual motivations as discretionary accruals reflect the influence of combined accounting choices of a corporation on its profit. We find that： Corporations with pay contract or higher gearing ratio are more inclined to choose combined accounting policies to increase current profit; Affected by the special domestic social environment, political cost test has an opposite result to the hypothesis.