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信息不对称与上市公司股权再融资偏好 被引量:14

Information Asymmetry and the Listed Companies' SEO Preference
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摘要 大量理论和实证研究表明:上市公司应该避免采用股权再融资方式筹集资金,以减少对公司价值产生的负面影响。但是国内外仍有不少上市公司采用股权再融资,我国还呈现强烈的股权再融资偏好,这说明上市公司采用股权再融资存在一定理论依据。运用信息经济学理论,从信息不对称角度对此现象进行解释,结论为信息不对称产生的“逆向选择”和“道德风险”给上市公司采用股权再融资方式找到充分的理由。我国不合理的制度背景,产生更加严重的信息不对称,造成我国上市公司强烈的股权再融资偏好。 Many theoretical and empirical analyses indicate that the listed companies should avoid using the seasoned equity offering (SEO) to raise funds because it may have negative effect on the corporate value. But in the real life, SEO is preferred by many listed companies, especially in China. This fact tells us that there must be some theoretical foundation for SEO. In this essay, we borrow some theories from information economics to make some explanation from the angle of information asymmetry. And our conclusion is that due to the existence of adverse selection and moral hazard caused by the information asymmetry, the listed companies have sufficient reasons to implement SEO, though it may reduce corporate value. And in China, the listed companies usually have very strong preference for SEO because the problem of asymmetric information is more serious due to the illogical institutions.
作者 管征 范从来
出处 《金融理论与实践》 北大核心 2006年第4期3-6,共4页 Financial Theory and Practice
基金 南京大学"985工程"经济转型与发展创新基地资助项目的研究
关键词 股权再融资 信息不对称 逆向选择 道德风险 seasoned equity offering (SEO) information asymmetry adverse selection moral hazard
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参考文献10

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