公司治理机制的替代效应研究

A Study on the Substitute Effect of Corporation Governance

现代经济理论已证明了外部和内部机制都可以缓解代理问题,然而实证分析往往得出不同甚至矛盾的结果。本文认为不同的治理机制并不是独立运作的,可能存在某种重要的替代关系。本文运用规范分析的方法逻辑推演了董事会监督动力与两职状况、外部大股东监督、经理人员持股激励、经理人员相互监督动力之间存在重要的替代关系。

Contemporary economic theories have already proved that both exterior and interior governance mechanism can slow down the problem of the agent. However, empirical analysis usually produces various or even conflicting results. We think that different governance mechanism does not act solely and there exists some important substitution relationship with each other. This paper analysizes the relationship of substitution between directorate supervising and CEO-dual,out-stockholder, in-stockholder and managers supervisor. This result has an important role in the company governance.