具有风险规避者加盟的供应链协作回购契约机制研究

Research on Buy back Contract Mechanism for Supply Chain Coordination With a Risk-Averse Retailer

探讨了一类具有风险规避特性的零售商加盟的供应链协作契约机制设计问题。研究了零售商为风险中性时选择的订货行为和零售商为风险规避者时的订货行为,研究结果表明具有风险规避性的零售商最优订货量要比风险中性的零售商选择的最优订货量小,同时还发现供应商为激励具有风险规避特性的零售商所支付的单位商品回购价格,要比激励风险中性的零售商所支付的单位回购价格高。此外还证明了单位商品回购价格随零售商的风险规避系数增加而增加,并通过案例分析验证了该结论。

This paper studies the incentive mechanism of supply chain coordination with a risk-averse retailer. It studies the order behaviors of a risk-averse retailer and a risk-neutral retailer,and finds out that the optimal order quantity of a risk-averse retailer is less than that of a risk-neutral retailer, and also finds out that the supplier must pay higher buyback contract price for a risk--averse retailer than for a risk-neutral retailer. It also proofs that the payback contract price increases with the increase of the risk-averse coefficient of the retailer. At last, the conclusion is verified by a case study.