具备提供服务的供应链博弈分析

Game analysis in a supply chain with service provision

考虑在只包含一个供应商和一个零售商的供应链中,用提供给顾客的服务来提升实际需求,以提高供应链的局部或整体效益.但是服务的提供或者由其中一个成员提供,或者由他们共同提供.基于服务提供者的不同,分别研究了在Stackelberg和Nash博弈中供应商和零售商的决策.研究表明,当供应链中有提供给顾客的服务时,在Stackelberg博弈下,供销双方都能从中得到更多的利润;但是在Nash博弈下,服务提供方只有在一定的条件下才能从中受益.当只有一个成员提供服务时,文中给出了一个成员愿意由自己提供服务或愿意让对方提供的条件.得到了两个主要结果:在Stackelberg博弈中,由供应商和零售商共同提供服务对他们来说都是最好的选择;在Nash博弈中,并没有类似的结果,在某些条件下零售商更愿意作Stackel-berg跟从者.

This paper is concerned with a one-supplier-one-retailer supply chain in which the additional service can be offered to its customers by the supplier or the retailer or both of them. We consider three different channel structures based on who provide（s） the customer service. We show that, both the supplier and the retailer can be always benefited no matter who provides service in the Stackelberg game. Given that there is only on member who can provide service, we identify the conditions under which who is willing to provide service. Furthermore, under the Staekelberg game framework, the bes＇t strategy is that both the supplier and the retailer provide service. While under the Nash game framework , the retailer is willing to act as a Stackelberg follower under certain