公平偏好与锦标激励

Fairness Preferences and Tournament Incentives

行为合约理论认为代理人具有公平偏好,会关注自己的物质收益与他人相比是否公平,因而试图建立包含公平偏好的最优激励合约。在锦标激励中,这种公平偏好一方面是由于参与约束效应会降低代理人的努力程度,另一方面是由于激励相容约束效应提高代理人的努力程度,参与约束效应占主导作用,在最优的锦标激励制度下公平偏好会降低代理人的努力程度和委托人的期望收益水平。因此积极识别员工的公平偏好对企业制定恰当的锦标激励制度具有重要意义。

Behavioral contract theory tries to design optimal incentive contracts based on fairness preferences, which mean that agents will pay attention to the comparisons of his payoff and others. In tournament contests, the fairness preferences on one hand will reduce efforts of agents because of participation constraint effect, and on the other hand will increase efforts of agents because of incentive compatibility constraint effect. But the participation constraint effect is the dominant power and the fairness preferences will reduce the efforts of agents and therefore the expected profit of principal. So it is very important for corporations to screen and evaluate precisely the fairness preferences of employees when designing the tournament system.