摘要
文章基于对现存研发人员激励理论的评述,运用动态博弈论的分析方法,构建了一个企业研发人员激励机制的动态模型。通过分析指出,一个有效的研发激励机制,应该使风险收入在研发人员的报酬中占相当比重;考虑研发人员的风险承受能力及其努力的成本;与企业知识积累的数量和质量的提高挂钩,才能使研发人员将自身利益与企业长远发展相结合,从而实现企业利益最大化。
Based on incentive theory of enterprises' scientific research personnel and by using methods of dynamic games analysis, this paper makes an attempt in building a dynamic model of incentive mechanism for R & D personnel. In an effective incentive mechanism, venture income should be a greater part in earnings of R & D personnel, and we should put other elements into consideration, connect the quantity of accumulating enterprises' knowledge with its quality and combine individual interest of R & D personnel with enterprises' long-term development. Only by doing so, an enterprise can realize its interest on a maximum scale. Translated by Tang Jun
出处
《生产力研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第2期202-204,共3页
Productivity Research
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70473073)
