目标企业在反收购中的定价机制设计

The Pricing Mechanism Design of Target Company in Anti-Take Over

在收购与反收购的对抗中,要约价格是双方谈判的焦点,成为反收购方实现股东价值增加的关键因素.依据博弈论与信息经济学中的拍卖理论,对目标企业在反收购决策中的定价机制进行设计,并得出了均衡状态下收购方与目标公司作为不同局中人的最优报价策略.结果表明,在密封式第一价格拍卖情况下,目标公司为实现收益最大化,反收购方公布的最低价格应严格高于其私人价值,收购方的报价严格低于其私人价值.

During the confrontation of take over and anti-take over, bidder price is the focus in the negotiation, and it is the key factor adding stockholder value of anti-take over. According to the auctions theory of the game and information economics, a pricing mechanism of target company was designed in the anti-take over decision, and those players＇ optimal bid strategy in equilibrium was derived. The results show that in the condition of the first price sealed auction, for maximum gain, asking lowest price should strictly be higher than its private price, and bidding price should be strictly lower than its private price.