抵押、贷款合约与借款人行为

Collateral,Credit Contract and the Behavior of Borrowers

运用信息经济学理论,建立了不对称信息条件下信贷市场博弈模型,研究了抵押对借款人风险的事前甄别作用和对其履约行为的事后激励作用.结果表明,在一定条件下,抵押可以有效地解决信息不对称的信贷市场中存在的逆向选择和道德风险问题.利用借款人的自我选择机制,银行可以通过合适的分离合约来有效地降低贷款中的信用风险.提出在我国经济和社会发展的现阶段,抵押的作用受到一些现实约束的抑制和抵消.

Based on the theory of information economics, a credit market game model under asymmetric information was established. By using the model, the role of collateral in an asymmetric credit market is examined. Both ex ante adverse selection and ex post moral hazard are considered. The main point is that the use of collateral often efficiently resolves moral hazard and adverse selection problems under a certain condition. By means of self-selection mechanism of borrowers, separating contracts may be useful devices to decrease credit risk of bank loans. Yet the realistic restrains in our country partially counteract the effects of collateral.